We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb - and cheap - example of "net-war" look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters.
It isn't a question of whether or not we want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We're in a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies.
[...]
But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is super power. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition), we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly.
We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs.
Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can't kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution. The truth is that even if you can't kill yourself out of the problem, you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting.
And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The cliches exist because they're true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it's far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they're allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond.
Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you're not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you.
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It is not enough to materially defeat your enemy. You must convince your enemy that he has been defeated. You cannot do that by bombing empty buildings. You must be willing to kill in the short term to save lives and foster peace in the long term.
It is not a matter of whether attrition is good or bad. It's necessary. Only the shedding of their blood defeats resolute enemies. Especially in our struggle with God-obsessed terrorists - the most implacable enemies our nation has ever faced - there is no economical solution. Unquestionably, our long-term strategy must include a wide range of efforts to do what we, as outsiders, can to address the environmental conditions in which terrorism arises and thrives (often disappointingly little - it's a self-help world). But, for now, all we can do is to impress our enemies, our allies, and all the populations in between that we are winning and will continue to win.
The only way to do that is through killing.
Monday, June 28, 2004
War of Attrition
From the purely military perspective, the Iraq war was different from virtually any other war waged before it. The new theory of warfare - that technological superiority is the key component of future warfare - has been both successful and problematic. Using limited ground forces, in conjunction with technology in the form of precision guided munitions, UAVs, and a networked digital battlefield, the US was able to overthrow a regime quickly and with minor casualties to itself. In this the new theory of warfare was successful. On the other hand, the very success of this new warfare has been the prime cause of our post-war security problems; having barely experienced war against them, Iraqis did not feel defeated. And as a result, elements of the former Iraqi forces continued fighting and receiving support from segments of the local population. Ralph Peters in this article for the US Army War College insists that we are engaged in a war of attrition and need to recognize this and fight accordingly.
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