Hizbullah Refuses

As would be expected Hizbullah has refused to disarm. Instead, they have made a deal with Lebanese PM Siniora that they will keep their arms, but not display them publicly. There is no chance that the Lebanese Army will attempt to disarm Hizbullah by force, since around half the army is Shiite and the military capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces is close to zero. At the same time, Kofi Annan has stated that "dismantling Hizbullah is not the direct mandate of the UN". So if the UN is not going to do it despite passing Resolution 1559 and 1701 - both demanding that Hizbullah be disarmed - and the LAF will not do it, who is left?

An official in Israel's Prime Minister's Office has stated that if Hizbullah refuses to disarm, Israel will restart the war. This seems highly unlikely. Israel would come under intense international condemnation and pressure if it were to restart the war without a direct Hizbullah attack - and at this point Hizbullah would be crazy to do something like that. This threat sounds a lot like the threatened full-scale invasion that kept getting delayed; it is meant purely for political effect - a way to prod the UN to do something. The UN of course will do nothing, no matter how much Tzipi Livni talks to Kofi Annan. It will once again have proven itself to be completely powerless and useless in any matter that requires something more than talk, and dangerous to the security of Israel.

By not allowing the IDF to achieve a decisive military victory, Olmert destroyed the perception of the invincibility of the IDF. From Stratfor:

In the regional equation, there has been an immutable belief: that, at the end of the day, IDF was capable of imposing a unilateral military solution on any Arab force. Israel might have failed to achieve its political goals in its various wars, but it never failed to impose its will on an enemy force. As a result, all neighboring nations and entities understood there were boundaries that could be crossed only if a country was willing to accept a crushing Israeli response. All neighboring countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, prior to the collapses of central authority -- understood this and shaped their behavior in view of it.
...
In this conflict, what Hezbollah has achieved is not so much a defeat of Israel as a demonstration that destruction in detail is not an inevitable outcome of challenging Israel. Hezbollah has showed that it is possible to fight to a point that Israel prefers a cease-fire and political settlement to a military victory followed by political accommodation. Israel might not have lost any particular battle, and a careful analysis of the outcome could prove its course to be reasonable. But the loss of the sense -- and historical reality -- of the inevitability of Israeli military victory is a far more profound defeat for Israel, as this clears the way for other regional powers to recalculate risks.

At the same time, he has placed Israel's security needs in the hands of the UN and a weak international force. By his actions, he has reaped neither the benefits of a military victory nor of the negotiated solution for which he waged the military campaign.

So what next? It is almost inevitable that there will be another round. This may not happen right away, and most likely will not be under the direction of the present government. Efraim Inbar suggests that in this next round it should not be just Hizbullah that is targeted, but also Syria.

SUBDUING SYRIA is the key to managing the Lebanese crisis, to rolling back Hizbullah, and to weakening Iran and its radical Islamist influence in the Middle East. In order to attain victory in the next military engagement, Israel should target Damascus.

Syria allows supplies for Hizbullah to pass into Lebanon from its territory and provides the channel for Iran to do likewise. Syria's use of Hizbullah as a means of bleeding Israel has gone unpunished for too long.

That being the case, the strategic address for dealing with Hizbullah and for restoring lost deterrence remains Damascus. Only military pressure on the regime of Bashar Assad can deny Hizbullah military capabilities and signal Israel's readiness and ability to respond tenaciously.

Sooner or later this has to happen, although Israel will have to act carefully. It is not in Israel's - or the US's - interest for Assad to be overthrown. What replaces him could very well be more dangerous than the weak Assad.

The Best Information is Inside Information

It seems that IDF Chief of Staff has been caught in an "insider trading" scandal. A few hours after the Hizbullah cross-border attack and abduction of 2 soldiers, Gen. Halutz went to the bank to sell his portfolio of stocks.

"It was my portfolio of shares, on which I had lost NIS 25,000," Halutz told Maariv. "It is true that I sold the portfolio on July 12, 2006, but it is impossible to link that to the war. At the time I did not expect or think that there would be a war."

So a few hours after this attack, as the cabinet and military leaders met to discuss possible war, Halutz did not expect a war? Either he is a terrible liar, or he is out of the loop on major military decisions. This is simply another embarrassment in a long line of embarrassments in the conduct of this war.

The Aftermath

Nothing new in this Yossi Klein Halevy article, but a well written description of the feeling now in Israel.

The European View

Given the European reaction to Israel's war against Hizbullah, here is what their reaction would have been to another instance of Jews defending themselves.

Who Won?

President Bush today declared that Hizbullah suffered a defeat in this war. PM Olmert declared that Hizbullah suffered a "harsh blow". And as would be expected Nasrallah claimed a "strategic, historic victory." So who won and what?

There were 5 main players involved in this war - Israel, Hizbullah, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran - and it's important to see what each has won and lost over the course of the last month. While most pundits see simply an Israeli defeat and a Hizbullah victory, the situation - as is often the case - is a bit more complex. So here's my attempt to sort out the results.

ISRAEL
Israel's stated war aims - at least its initial war aims - were the return of the two kidnapped soldiers, the destruction of Hizbullah as a fighting force, and the removal of the rocket threat to its northern cities. Judged by these aims, Israel failed since it was not able to achieve any of them. As I have written before, this failure was due entirely to the tactics of the political echelon and not the IDF. Olmert and Peretz decided that they would talk of military goals, but attempt to achieve those goals diplomatically. It is the first time in Israel's history that it went to war in order for a cease-fire to be imposed. Previously, the IDF would attempt to accomplish as much as possible before the imposition of a ceasefire by the "international community". Had the initial cease-fire agreement between the US and France been approved, instead of the one actually approved, Israel could have claimed that it achieved its ends diplomatically. However, UNSC Resolution 1701 leaves the matter of Hizbullah disarmament and the return of the IDF soldiers very vague.

Israel's main loss is in the area of deterrence. Again, I will quote Stratfor's analysis:

The first strategy was the air campaign. The second strategy was a complex warfighting/diplomacy strategy designed to achieve Israel's ends without having to systematically destroy Hezbollah. The end result of this strategy -- if it is carried out to its logical conclusion -- is that Hezbollah will have fought and survived, and that in fighting, it will have shaped Israeli political decisions. In other words, we will have moved from a world in which Israel's military force trumps all other considerations to a world in which Israeli military power is circumscribed by Arab power.

It seems clear that Israel could have crushed Hezbollah if it was willing to spend the lives. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's view seems to have been the rational one -- that the rockets Hezbollah has been firing at Israel were creating fewer casualties by far than a war would. On that cost-benefit analysis, Olmert not only was correct, but followed the reasoning of Ariel Sharon. Sharon's strategy focused on building barriers between Israel and Arabs in order to avoid the costs and casualties involved in counterinsurgency operations. Olmert has extended that logic to southern Lebanon, seeking a low-cost solution to the Hezbollah threat.

In so doing, Olmert, intentionally or not, has shifted the basic architecture of Israel's strategic policy. He has avoided an extravagant cost in lives, but in so doing, has undermined the military certainty that was the foundation of Israeli national security. Hezbollah was able to start a war and has survived it defensively. In due course, an Arab force will be able to start an offensive war and win it. There is no inherent reason that an Arab army cannot defeat an Israeli army. Whether there is a cease-fire or not, the psychological foundation of Israeli power has been breached.

This is a major change in the Middle East, the results of which will have long-lasting repercussions vis-a-vis the entire balance of power. Already Syria is saying that the chances of peace with Israel are low, and that they will "liberate the Golan", and Hamas will attempt to adopt Hizbullah tactics.

Overall, Israel has lost much and gained little. One can only hope that the political establishment and the IDF will learn lessons from this war that they will be able to apply to the next round. They have been very good at doing this in the past.

HIZBULLAH
Hizbullah's main achievement has been its survival. In being able to hold off the IDF for a month, they have emerged as the best Arab army, and the only one not to have been fully defeated by Israel. This has added to their prestige in Lebanon and throughout the Arab world. In enhancing their reputation, they have also effected a stealth coup d'etat in Lebanon. They are now the power, and the Lebanese government must go to them for all decisions. While this may have been the case previously, it was behind the scenes. Now it is fully out in the open.

However, Hizbullah has paid a very high price for this "victory". They have lost most of their long-range missiles and launchers - taken out by Israel in the first day of the war - and they have suffered somewhere around 500 dead. For a fighting force of 3000-5000, this is a tremendous loss. Additionally, their network of bunkers and tunnels has been exposed, and their fighting tactics revealed. Armies that win wars - or think they win wars - are less likely to learn lessons, and if fighting resumes, they will be at a significant disadvantage. Hubris has its costs.

Overall, Hizbullah has achieved much in this war but at the same time has suffered serious losses. They have been somewhat degraded as a fighting force, but politically have made major gains.

LEBANON
Lebanon is the clear loser in this war. Their infrastructure has been damaged to the tune of $2-$4 billion, and for a country with a total GDP of around $20 billion, it will take quite a while for them to recover. More importantly, their government has been exposed as completely powerless and is now run by Hizbullah. PM Siniora's life is now clearly in danger, and the gains of the Cedar Revolution seem to be no more than memories. Unless the UN force moving in can actually control Hizbullah, and this is highly unlikely, they will have to wait for Israel to fully and completely destroy Hizbullah in the next war if they hope to regain their country.

SYRIA
Assad is thrilled that he didn't get dragged into this war. If he had, he would most likely no longer be the ruler of Syria. Syria's gain is that they did not get punished for their support and supply of Hizbullah. This will undoubtedly lead them to the conclusion that they can continue their support not just of Hizbullah, but of Hamas and of insurgents in Iraq.

IRAN
Like Syria, Iran was not punished - as of yet - for their support of Hizbullah. Their status, as the backers of the premiere Arab army, has certainly been enhanced. And they have received valuable information on the performance of their weapons systems. But the outcome for them is a lot more mixed. Undoubtedly they are unhappy with Hizbullah losing so much of the hardware that they provided - estimates of the dollar value of the losses are around $2 billion. Much more importantly, they have lost a major deterrent. Hizbullah's rockets and missiles were supposed to be the deterrent threat to Israel and the US in the event of an attack on Iran's nuclear program. This deterrent is now gone for the Iranians, both physically in the destroyed Zelzal missiles, as well as strategically. It will be difficult for Iran to smuggle more of the Zelzals to Hizbullah; they are very large systems requiring a truck to launch, and everyone is now watching what they are doing. Their support for Hizbullah will be another in the long list of US grievances against them.

I think that this war is far from over. Just tonight there was a report of Hizbullah firing 10 Katyusha rockets. All of them landed inside Lebanon, so Israel is not responding. If Hizbullah is seen to violate the cease-fire, Israel will be able to finish them off. It is what the US, Lebanon, Israel, and most countries of the Middle East are secretly hoping for.

Interview With Brig. General Kuperwasser

A very interesting interview with Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser, the former head of the research division of the IDF Military Intelligence.

Resolution?

Apparently, the US and France have reached a compromise on the ceasefire resolution and the UN Security Council will take up the matter at 3pm Eastern Time, with a possible vote this afternoon. The Resolution seems to be pretty much the same as I wrote about last night. It will be up to Israel to decide what to do, since most likely Hizbullah will (at least at first) abide by the ceasefire - they have achieved their strategic goals.

Ari Shavit is absolutely right that if Olmert accepts this ceasefire he should resign immediately.

Ehud Olmert may decide to accept the French proposal for a cease-fire and unconditional surrender to Hezbollah. That is his privilege. Olmert is a prime minister whom journalists invented, journalists protected, and whose rule journalists preserved. Now the journalists are saying run away. That's legitimate. Unwise, but legitimate.

However, one thing should be clear: If Olmert runs away now from the war he initiated, he will not be able to remain prime minister for even one more day. Chutzpah has its limits. You cannot lead an entire nation to war promising victory, produce humiliating defeat and remain in power. You cannot bury 120 Israelis in cemeteries, keep a million Israelis in shelters for a month, wear down deterrent power, bring the next war very close, and then say - oops, I made a mistake. That was not the intention. Pass me a cigar, please.

On Again

The Israeli Cabinet has given the green light for the IDF to advance to the Litani. The reason given is that not enough diplomatic progress has been made. At the same time, they have decided that if progress is made, then the IDF will once again been stopped.

Napoleon once said "If you start to take Vienna, take Vienna". PM Olmert and co. should have been reminded of this maxim before beginning this war. Unfortunately, Israel at this point does not have the leadership to be able to take a decision and carry it through to its necessary conclusion. Uri Dan writes about this leadership vacuum and concludes:

I have this to say to the government: If you do not bomb Hizbullah to kingdom come now, you will have lost the right to blame the allies of World War II for not bombing Auschwitz.

Five Minutes to Midnight

At The Corner on National Review Online, Michael Ledeen posts a piece written by Robert Tracinski from The Intellectual Activist (subscription required). It is about the inevitability of war with Iran. It's somewhat long, but well worth reading. Here's one part of it:

It is, indeed, "five minutes to midnight"—not just for Israel, but for the West. The time is very short now before we will have to confront Iran. The only question is how long we let events spin out of our control, and how badly we let the enemy hit us before we begin fighting back.

We can't avoid this war, because Iran won't let us avoid it. That is the real analogy to the 1930s. Hitler came to power espousing the goal of German world domination, openly promising to conquer neighboring nations through military force and to persecute and murder Europe's Jews. He predicted that the free nations of the world would be too weak—too morally weak—to stand up to him, and European and American leaders spent the 1930s reinforcing that impression. So Hitler kept advancing—the militarization of the Rhineland in 1936, the Spanish bombing campaign in 1937, the annexation of Austria and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938, the invasion of Poland in 1939—until the West finally, belated decided there was no alternative but war.

That is what is playing out today. Iran's theocracy has chosen, as the nation's new president, a religious fanatic who believes in the impending, apocalyptic triumph of Islam over the infidels. He openly proclaims his desire to create an Iranian-led Axis that will unite the Middle East in the battle against America, and he proclaims his desire to "wipe Israel off the map," telling an audience of Muslim leaders that "the main solution" to the conflict in Lebanon is "the elimination of the Zionist regime." (Perhaps this would be better translated as Ahmadinejad's "final solution" to the problem of Israel.)

Like Hitler, Ahmadinejad regards the free nations of the world as fading "sunset" powers, too morally weak to resist his legions of Muslim fanatics. And when we hesitate to kill Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq, when we pressure Israel to rein in its attacks on Hezbollah, when we pander to the anti-Jewish bigotry of the "Muslim street"—we reinforce his impression of our weakness.

Ceasefire

A new ceasefire resolution is being discussed at the UN. It seems that there is a good chance that this resolution will be voted on tomorrow and will pass. If approved, this ceasefire will prove to be disastrous to Israel as well as to Us interests.

As now proposed, the ceasefire would have Israeli forces withdraw gradually as the Lebanese army reinforced by UN peacekeepers - mostly French troops - take control of south Lebanon. Hizbullah would have to move north of the Litani River. The resolution does not demand the disarming of Hizbullah, as Resolution 1559 demanded, and it does not demand the return of the kidnapped Israeli soldiers. Lebanon and Hizbullah would be stupid not to accept this ceasefire. The IDF is rightly upset about this ceasefire. It is a complete defeat, both strategically and tactically, for Israel. As Stratfor pointed out this morning, Israel had just seized the strategically important village of Marjayoun, from where they could move west to the Litani River, north to the Bekaa, or both. Such an operation would envelop Hizbullah in the south, and destroy its base in the Bekaa Valley. It seems that this operation will now be cancelled, and Hizbullah will have decisively won.

It should also be clear what the result of the peacekeepers in South Lebanon will be. Hizbullah will not be disarmed. No matter what kind of arms embargo is placed on Hizbullah, they will rearm with weapons from Syria and Iran. At some point in the not too distant future Hizbullah will once again launch missiles at Israeli cities, and because of the presence of the peacekeeper Israel will be unable to respond. In effect, the peacekeepers will be the protectors of Hizbullah. Any hope that Lebanon would become a normal, stable country is gone. It will have been, in effect, taken over by Hizbullah. Israel's deterrence will have been tremendously eroded, and to regain it they will need to do something truly dramatic - taking out Iran's nuclear program is one such possibility, though this would undoubtedly lead to a much more serious war.

Prime Minister Olmert, Defence Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of Staff Halutz are the people most responsible for this utter failure. Their passivity and hesitation has made this defeat possible. It should have been clear to them that the US could only protect Israel from the "international community" for so long. It is one of the reasons why IDF doctrine has always been based on a short war with overwhelming firepower. It should also have been clear to them that once they embarked on this war, they had to win. And while Olmert spoke often and passionately about winning, he did nothing to make it happen.

The only hope, at this point, is that Hizbullah and Lebanon behave like their Arab brethren before them and pass up this ceasefire in favor of believing their own bluster. Otherwise, the region and the world will have become a much more dangerous place.

Bellum Interruptus

It seems that the US is putting pressure on Olmert to delay the promised offensive.

The troops were already rolling late Wednesday when they were ordered to halt. It appears heavy US pressure delayed the offensive to allow diplomacy to run its course. A senior minister said Wednesday that Israel might delay the expansion for 2-3 days for that purpose.

This was inevitable given how long it has taken Israel to actually start moving. It's pretty clear that the diplomacy is unlikely to produce any result good for Israel, but Olmert seems more than happy to delay. He is undoubtedly Israel's most incompetent PM to date.

On the other hand, there do seem to be some positive results that have been achieved by the IDF already. Ken Timmerman lists a number of them. I think he is being overly optimistic on the achievements.

Missiles Fired at Tel Aviv?

Yoni the Blogger relays information that Hizbullah today fired 3 missiles that were aimed at Tel Aviv. None of the missiles made it, but they were of a different type than previously fired missiles.

State Of The War

Israel's security cabinet today approved the expansion of ground operations in Lebanon, although it seems that this does not mean that the IDF is cleared to go in right away. The plan, as reported, is to drive to the Litani River - about 20 miles to the North - and then clear Hizbullah out of South Lebanon. According to the Jerusalem Post, there are about 40,000 IDF troops waiting on the border to advance. If implemented, this is the ground campaign that should have been waged from the very beginning.

Such an invasion would be classic IDF fighting doctrine, as opposed to what has been going on for the last 3 plus weeks. The idea would be a fast move up to the Litani, surrounding but bypassing Hizbullah strongholds to get to the enemy rear. This could be accomplished in a week, according to one IDF general. After that, it would take 4-6 weeks to clear out the Hizbullah strongholds and remove, or at least reduce, the Katyusha threat. The clearing out operations will be difficult and exact fairly high casualties on the IDF (estimates are between 100 and 200 dead). Stratfor's (subscription required) analysis:

Hezbollah presents both the complexities of fourth-generation warfare that the United States faces in Iraq and the intractability of a deeply entrenched enemy. In the course of engaging positions as well-camouflaged and heavily fortified as Hezbollah's, there are stages of the engagement where an attacker must absorb casualties while inflicting zero casualties on the defender. The purpose of defensive fortifications is to force the attacker into these positions for the longest amount of time to maximize attackers' vulnerability to the defender's established and covered fields of fire. There are also shoulder constraints, restricting the number of attacking troops that can effectively mass inside of these defensive constraints. Thus, a successful assault is not always a matter of how many troops or how many casualties an attacker is willing to take, but rather a function of the tactics used. Hezbollah has so far seemed able to deal effectively with smaller incursions by the IDF composed of an infantry escort for a platoon of three or four tanks.

It seems to me that this is exactly the reason that Israel is hesitating in enacting this plan. More than simply an operational plan, Israel is trying to pressure the "international community" to come up with a viable diplomatic solution so that it will not have to carry out such an invasion. This is a losing proposition. It's doubtful that the UN will come up with a Resolution acceptable to Israel, and waiting another few days while continuing to bomb will only bring more comments like this from the US (comments from European and Arab countries are not really important at this point).

By waging the war as Israel has waged it for the last 3 weeks - that is to say poorly - Israel has put itself in a horrible position. At this point, it is hard to see what kind of outcome will not allow Hizbullah to claim victory and to enhance its reputation and prestige - as well as control of Lebanon. Hizbullah has been able to withstand the aerial bombardment as well as the assaults of the IDF - assaults that have up to now been reminiscent of the poorly planned IDF armor charges against the Egyptians in the first few days of the Yom Kippur War. Israel has thus been forced into the position of not being able to lose, no matter what the casualties are. Outside of this they need to accomplish something dramatic like killing Nasrallah or freeing the two kidnapped soldiers, neither of which seems likely at this point.

Overall, this war has been incompetently managed by Olmert, Peretz, Halutz and OC Northern Command General Adam. The best that Israel can hope for now is a tactical victory where it kills a large number of Hizbullah fighters and destroys Hizbullah's infrastructure in south Lebanon. But at this point, a strategic victory over Hizbullah seems out of reach. The seeds of the next regional Middle East war have been sown.

August 22nd

When Iran said that it would respond to the US nuclear offer on August 22nd, many analysts were puzzled as to why he chose precisely that date. Now it is becoming more clear. Bernard Lewis, in today's Wall Street Journal op/ed page (subscription required) explains the importance of that date.

This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to "the farthest mosque," usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (c.f., Koran XVII.1). This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.

If it isn't clear yet, it should be becoming clearer that we are not dealing with a rational leader. Mutual Assured Destruction, the threat of total annihilation of all that was enough to keep the US and Soviet Union from going to war, will not work against madmen intent on bringing on the end of days. Until we acknowledge who we are up against - who our enemy is and what they are capable of - we will never be able to confront them.

French Perfidy...Again!

The French have done it again. The US spent days negotiating with France a ceasefire resolution to bring to the UN. The US compromised on the French desire for 2 resolutions instead of one. The US compromised on the French desire for the sequence of events - first a ceasefire then an international force. And now after all this, the French are backing out. According to CNN and FoxNews, France has stated that they are not happy with the resolution and reneging on the agreements with the US. They are once again puckering up their lips to the Arab asses and supporting all the Arab demands, especially for an Israeli withdrawal. Why should the US ever negotiate with them again? What a worthless country.

One of these days, their displays of weakness towards the Arabs will come back to haunt them. Despite all their ass-kissing of the Arabs (or maybe because of it) there will be a terrorist attack in a French city, and that will be the first time I will applaud the Arabs for their action. Eurabia indeed!

Just War

In the past few weeks, with Israel's war with Hizbullah, the concept of Just War has once again come to the forefront. Just War Theory says that a war is justified if it is waged based on a number of conditions. These are usually divided into jus ad bello (when it is justified to go to war) and jus in bello (how a war is waged). Most rational commentators agree that Israel's campaign against Hizbullah meets the first condition - Israel was justified in waging war on Hizbullah. On the second issue - of how Israel is waging the war - there is much more disagreement.

But what if this concept is itself outdated or simply doesn't work in the era of fourth-generation warfare. David Warren suggests that this is indeed the case. That by waging moral war, we do not save civilians, but actually endanger more of them.

By openly stating that we will, under no circumstances, attack targets where civilians are present, we "“hand the foe a blueprint of our acts, incite him to step over our carefully drawn line, encourage his vice and incur our own defeat."” (I am quoting a priest who has considered the broader implications of the Catholic just war doctrine.)

Even "just war"” acknowledges that, as in medicine, real mercy can sometimes require ruthlessness. We have forgotten this in the West. If we want to save civilians, over the longer run, we must resolve to call the enemyÂ’s bluff. Show him by our actions that hiding behind baby carriages will not save him. For the enemy will only stop using “human shields” when they cease to serve his purposes.

One Lebanese Who Gets It

The New Republic has posted an extraordinary article by a journalist living in Beirut.

Lebanon a victim? What a joke!

Before the Israeli attack, Lebanon no longer existed, it was no more than a hologram. In Beirut, innocent citizens like me were forbidden access to certain areas of their own capital. But our police, our army, and our judges were also excluded. That was the case, for example, of Hezbollah's and the Syrians' command zone in the Haret Hreik quarter (in red on the satellite map). A square measuring a kilometer wide, a capital within the capital, permanently guarded by a Horla army, possessing its own institutions, its schools, its crèches, its tribunals, its radio, its television and, above all ... its government. A "government" that, alone decided, in the place of the figureheads of the Lebanese government--in which Hezbollah also had its ministers!--to attack a neighboring state, with which we had no substantial or grounded quarrel, and to plunge the United States into a bloody conflict. And if attacking a sovereign nation on its territory, assassinating eight of its soldiers, kidnapping two others and, simultaneously, launching missiles on nine of its towns does not constitute a casus belli, the latter juridical principle will seriously need revising.

Behe clearly sees that the people responsible for this war are the powerless and gutless members of Lebanon's government, who allowed Hizbullah to hijack the country. I am sure that many Lebanese think the same way but can not or are afraid to publicly say what Behe says.

But more than just this war being Lebanon's fault, it is the fault of the "international community". As they have done numerous times, they passed resolutions and then failed to enforce them. Had Resolution 1559 actually been implemented and Hizbullah disarmed, there would have been no war. Had the Taif accords been actually implemented, Hizbullah would never have acquired 15,000 rockets and missiles. But as always, the diplomats in Turtle Bay can will the ends but never the means of achieving those ends. And by that, they have made themselves worse than useless; they have become abettors and appeasers of the fascists of our age.

Mughniyah Wounded?

According to Geostrategy-Direct(registration required), Imad Mughniyah, the Hizbullah mastermind terrorist who was responsible for the attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1982, as well as numerous Israeli and Jewish targets has been seriously wounded.

Mughniyah, the foreign liaison and intelligence chief for Hizbullah, attended a Hizbullah meeting of commanders on July 19 when Israeli fighter-jets struck their headquarters in southern Beirut. Western intelligence sources said part of the command bunker collapsed, killing or wounding most of the dozen people inside.

If this is actually true, it would be a big blow to Hizbullah's terrorist operations. Mughniyah was also in charge of delivering weapons to the Palestinians, including organizing the Karine-A weapons shipment. Israel is also saying that more than 40 high-ranking Hizbullah commanders have been killed, though they haven't identified exactly who.

I'm Back

Its been almost a year since I blogged last. And now it feels like its time to start up again; the Nudnikette has been urging me to blog instead of bother her with my rants. So here we go again. I apologize in advance for my initial rustiness, but hopefully I will get back into it quickly enough.

And the War on Terror Goes On

7/7/2005